JunoClaw Agentic AI Toolchain
MCP Wallet Seed Exposure, Shell Command Injection, and SSRF in a Blockchain Agent Platform
JunoClaw disclosed four vulnerabilities in its agentic AI platform on Juno Network. The most critical: every MCP write tool accepted a raw BIP-39 mnemonic as an explicit tool-call parameter, embedding the wallet seed in LLM tool-call JSON and exposing it to any transport, log, or telemetry surface between the LLM provider and the MCP process. Compounding this, a shell plugin permitted command injection via metacharacter bypass, and the WAVS bridge allowed SSRF via unvalidated URL fetching. All issues are addressed in @junoclaw/cosmos-mcp version 0.3.0 and later.
"Every MCP write tool ... accepted
mnemonic: stringas an explicit tool-call parameter. The BIP-39 seed was consequently embedded in the LLM tool-call JSON, exposing it to any transport, log, or telemetry surface in the path between the LLM provider and the MCP process."— GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-j75q-8xvm-6c48
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